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The enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA)' marks a dra-
matic revision in bail administration." Prior to the 1984 Act, bail was
understood chiefly as a means of guaranteeing the integrity of the judicial
system by assuring the defendant's appearance at trial.' The BRA, how-
ever, represents a "significant departure"4 from this traditional philosophy
because it authorizes a judicial officer to incarcerate an individual to
thwart future crimes." Expressly authorized pretrial detention based upon
a prediction of future dangerousness is unprecedented in this country's
history of criminal justice. Indeed, it defies traditional notions of liberty
and justice prior to trial.7
Although the BRA contains detailed guidelines judicial officers must
follow in order to deny bail," it provides no statutory standard for appeals
courts to review lower court bail determinations. Consequently, a sharp
division among the circuits has arisen. Some circuits demand de novo re-
view of trial court decisions,9 while others give great deference to lower
court rulings and will reverse only if the lower court has committed clear
error.1 ° In order to ensure uniform, just review, it is essential to determine
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988)).
2. A number of articles assess the BRA's impact on the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Gold-
camp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1 (1985) (discussing problems inherent in pretrial detention based on dangerousness); Lay & De
La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 Wm. MrrCHELL L. REV. 929 (1985)
(discussing revisions in bail made by 1984 Act).
3. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); see also Verrilli, The Eighth Amendment and the
Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 328, 331 (1982) (original purpose of bail
was to preserve judicial integrity).
4. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3185-86 [hereinafter S. REP.].
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1988); see also S. REP., supra note 4, at 6-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3189-90.
6. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1950).
7. See Note, When Preventive Detention is (Still) Unconstitutional: The Invalidity of the Pre-
sumption in the 1984 Federal Bail Statute, 61 S. CAL L. REv. 1091 (1988).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988).
9. E.g., United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Delker, 757
F.2d 1390, 1399 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1487 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Montamedi, 767 F.2d
1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. E.g., United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th
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which standard better comports with the legislative intent of Congress and
properly weighs the rights of the defendant. Pretrial detention is a reality
in our criminal justice system; therefore courts must develop a means of
carefully monitoring it to ensure that it is properly administered. A uni-
form standard of review should guarantee defendants fair and consistent
review, should achieve congressionally mandated objectives, and will pro-
vide guidance to judicial officers making release or detention
determinations.
This Note examines the review standards currently adopted by the
courts,"1 proposes a framework for determining an appropriate standard,
and recommends adoption of a two-pronged standard of review. Section I
of this Note suinmarizes the salient pretrial provisions of the BRA. Sec-
tion II traces the conflicting standards of review adopted by the circuits.
An analysis of important factors to consider in determining a proper re-
view standard appears in section III. Finally, section IV explores the in-
stitutional functions of trial and appellate courts and concludes by recom-
mending the adoption of a two-pronged standard of review. This standard
provides for a process-oriented review of district courts' fact-finding in-
quiries coupled with an independent evaluation of district courts' legal
determinations. A truly independent appellate review will ensure that
courts can safeguard the fundamental rights endangered by pretrial
detention.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE 1984 BAIL REFORM ACT
A. Overview of the BRA and Implications of United States v. Salerno
The BRA comprises the first title of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984.12 This Act repealed certain sections of the 1966 Bail Reform
Act" and established standards and procedures governing the release and
detention of defendants in Federal criminal cases. Congress implemented
the 1984 bail provision changes in large part to "address the alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release."1
Cir. 1985); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir. 1985).
11. This Note will not address review standards of bail pending appeal. Post-conviction bail stan-
dards are more stringent than pretrial standards because the presumption of the defendant's innocence
disappears after conviction. See S. REP., supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3186-3187, 3209 (comparison of pre- and post-conviction bail).
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
(1988)).
13. Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151
(1988)).
14. According to a study discussed in the legislative history, one out of every six defendants re-
leased pending trial was re-arrested, and one-third of these defendants were arrested more than once.
S. REP., supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3189.
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1. Section 3142: Release or Detention Pending Trial
The 1966 Bail Act authorized courts to incarcerate defendants thought
likely to flee before trial, but allowed courts to consider a defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness only in pretrial release decisions for capital offenses.15
In contrast, the BRA enables a judicial officer to deny bail to anyone
adjudged to pose a risk to community safety. 6 Although the Act favors
conditional release," subsection 3142(e) specifically requires that if "the
judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety
of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order
the detention of the person before trial." ' However, before the judicial
officer may impose pretrial detention, she must convene a "detention hear-
ing"1 9 to determine whether sufficient conditions exist to create the rebut-
table presumption of preventive detention.20
Subsection 3142(f) establishes the procedures for the detention hearing
and grants the defendant specific rights.21 Although subsection (f) creates
presumptions that actually favor imposing pretrial detention in a limited
class of cases,22 the government must proffer "clear and convincing"23 evi-
dence showing that no condition of release will reasonably assure the
safety of the community. Thus, pretrial detention is to be a last resort,
imposed only under certain prescribed conditions.24
Subsection 3142(g) enunciates specific factors the judicial officer must
consider in making her determination. If the judicial officer orders deten-
tion, subsection (i) requires her to provide detailed findings of fact and a
written statement supporting the detention order. Congress intended these
statements to create a well-documented record for the appellate court to
review.
15. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988)); see also Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 2, at 936-37 (comparing
1984 BRA to 1966 Bail Act).
16. Preventive detention is deemed presumptively correct if the defendant is charged with specified
offenses identified in the BRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988) (outlining conditions creating rebuttable
presumption of detention).
17. Section 3142(c) provides a detailed list of possible conditions of release and section 3142(d)
details grounds for temporary detention.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988).
19. Id. § 3142(0 (1988).
20. Section 3142(f) also provides an impressive array of procedural rights. See infra notes 46-50
and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988).
23. Id. § 3142(f) (1988).
24. See United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that BRA continues to
favor release over detention); see also S. REP., supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3189 (setting forth conditional release as preferable to detention).
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2. Section 3145: Review of Release or Detention Orders
Section 3145 addresses the review and appeal of release or detention
orders. When a magistrate conducts the initial detention hearing, the dis-
trict court, as the court of original jurisdiction, provides the first forum for
appeal.25 Unlike the 1966 Bail Act, however, which required the peti-
tioner to seek a second review from the initial trial court, subsection
3145(c) permits an expedited appeal from a final district court order.26
An additional change concerns the appealability of release orders.
Under the 1966 Bail Act, defendants possessed the exclusive right to ap-
peal a detention order.27 The government had no right to appeal the re-
lease of the defendant prior to trial. Subsection 3145(a), however, grants
the government an equal opportunity to seek appellate review of a release
order.28 These modifications represent a substantial change from the prior
bail law.
3. The Salerno Decision and Pretrial Detention
In United States v. Salerno29 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the preventive detention sections of the BRA. Rejecting consti-
tutional challenges presented by counsel, the Court held that while "[in
our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial ... is the
carefully limited exception," 30 preventive detention violates neither the
substantive nor procedural due process mandate of the Fifth Amendment,
nor the protections from excessive bail embodied in the Eighth Amend-
ment.3" The Court reasoned that preventive detention was not a violation
of substantive due process because Congress did not intend pretrial deten-
tion to be a form of punishment; rather, it found that preventive detention
was simply a regulatory tool adopted to achieve a compelling state inter-
est.32 The Court also dismissed procedural due process challenges to the
BRA. In light of the detailed procedural safeguards provided in the
Act-including expedited appellate review of detention orders33-the
Court did not find a violation of procedural due process requirements.3 4
The majority concluded its opinion with an extensive discussion of the
history of bail, finding that the Eighth Amendment posited no absolute
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1988).
26. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988) (providing for appeal
following final district court decision).
27. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988)).
28. See S. REP., supra note 4, at 29-30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3212-3213 (discussing government appeals).
29. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
30. Id. at 754-55.
31. Id. at 746-52.
32. Id. at 746-47.
33. Id. at 742-43.
34. Id. at 755 (special emphasis placed on adversarial process).
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right to bail. 5 The Court indicated that Congress could choose to deny
bail altogether, as it had in capital cases. It held that bail was, in effect, a
statutorily prescribed right because Eighth Amendment protections apply
solely in cases where Congress authorized bail."6 In those cases, courts
could consider bail excessive only when viewed in relation to the interests
being pursued. Because of the government's admitted interest in prevent-
ing crimes committed by persons released on bail, the Court deemed the
need for pretrial detention to outweigh the individual defendant's liberty
interest." Thus, the Court deferred to Congress in holding that pretrial
detention constitutes a legitimate means of preventing crimes committed
by persons who might otherwise be released on bail.3"
B. The Process of Review
1. The Role of the Magistrate
The district court remains the court of original jurisdiction for pretrial
bail determinations, but the Federal Magistrates Act empowers a magis-
trate to "issue orders pursuant to section 3142 . . .concerning release or
detention" of defendants prior to trial. 9 Thus, a magistrate will often
conduct the detention hearing and make the initial release or detention
decision.4 °
In practice, the defendant makes an initial appearance before the mag-
istrate shortly after arrest.41 During the course of this appearance, the Act
authorizes the magistrate to hold a detention hearing.42 As a routine mat-
ter, however, magistrates grant short continuances, 3 thereby giving the
parties time to prepare for the actual detention hearing.""
During the detention hearing itself, the BRA entitles the defendant to
be represented by counsel,45 present witnesses,40 testify in his own be-
35. Id. at 752-53.
36. Id. at 752-55. The Court indicated that it would not reach the larger issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment provided any limitations upon Congress. Id. at 752.
37. Id. at 748-750.
38. Id. at 742-45.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (1988). Section 3141(a) of title 18 authorizes any judicial officer who
can order an arrest to conduct the hearing. Thus, these "judicial officers" can include Justices or
judges of the United States, magistrates, and other court-appointed officials, and a variety of state
court judges.
40. This determination is subject to appellate review. 18 U.S.C § 3145 (1988).
41. The initial appearance is governed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
42. See Weinberg, Federal Bail and Detention Handbook, Cl-1181, P.L.J. 3-2 (1988).
43. Id.
44. A recent government study found that five days constituted the average pre-hearing prepara-
tion time. In view of the liberty interest at stake in such a magisterial determination, the amount of
time allotted for pre-hearing preparation seems inadequate. U.S. GENs. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
PORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL BAIL: How BAIL REFORM IS WORKING IN
SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS, GAO B-227612, at 7-15 (GAO/GGD 88-6 Bail Reform) (Oct. 1987)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (1988).
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half,47 cross-examine government witnesses who appear and testify,4s and
present additional evidence by proffer, hearsay, or other means.49 In short,
the magistrate must conduct a thorough adversarial proceeding before or-
dering detention.
In making the release or detention determination, the magistrate must
evaluate a number of statutorily prescribed factors"'-including a host of
"offense and offender characteristics."5' 1 The magistrate enjoys considera-
ble discretion in determining whether the combination of these factors is
sufficient to invoke the preventive detention order. Thus, the magistrate
performs a significant role in that she must determine, based upon "clear
and convincing" evidence presented at the detention hearing, whether to
release or detain the defendant-and if she decides to release him, under
what conditions that release should be granted.52 Unfortunately, early evi-
dence suggests that the hearings are woefully inadequate for evaluating
the necessity of detention-not that the hearing as established under the
BRA is inadequate in principle; rather, that the statutorily prescribed
procedures are seldom followed closely in practice.5" This circumstance is
not surprising because the BRA empowers magistrates to make complex
legal judgments affecting important constitutional rights even though most
magistrates are not trained lawyers.'
46. Id. The Third Circuit, however, has held that the defendant cannot subpoena witnesses,
which may make this an empty right. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1395 (3d Cir. 1985).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (Supp. V 1987). This entitlement may present problems of protecting
defendants' Fifth Amendment rights on the merits of the charges at trial. See United States v. Shakur,
817 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1987) (court may prohibit cross examination of defendant); United States
v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864 (1986) (court can grant "use-fruits"
immunity with respect to defendant's testimony).
48. Delker, 757 F.2d at 1398. The admissibility of hearsay evidence and the ability of the govern-
ment to preclude cross examination by presenting affidavits rather than the witnesses themselves,
however, weakens this right substantially. See United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence ruled
admissible).
49. The rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials do not apply to detention hearings. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(0 (Supp. V 1987); see also United States v. Golding, 742 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1984)
(evidence otherwise objectionable at trial admissible at pretrial detention hearing).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988).
51. Id.; see S. REP., supra note 4, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3201 (outlining offense and offender characteristics).
52. However, the magistrate is authorized to order detention only if it is the sole means of achiev-
ing the purposes of the Act. See United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir.) (bail
should be denied only in rare cases), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986); United States v.
Montamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (BRA continues to mandate release under least
restrictive means); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1985) (BRA favors release over
detention).
53. Indeed, in one preliminary study, the government has estimated that hearings last 10 minutes
or less in large districts and from 30 minutes to two hours in less crowded districts, hardly enough
time to conduct the thorough hearing mandated by the BRA. GAO REPORT, supra note 44, at 34.
54. See, e.g., L. SILBERMAN, NON-ATTORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY 24-25, 29 (1979) (estimating number of untrained and part-time magistrates).
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2. The Role of the District Court
The BRA authorizes the district court, as the court of original jurisdic-
tion, to hear the initial appeal from the magistrate." District courts may,
at their own discretion, independently review the magistrate's order and
conduct any necessary evidentiary hearings or receive additional affida-
vits. 6 The district court can change or amend the magisterial order as if it
were amending its own order.5 7
The BRA does not, however, specify the scope of review the district
court is to apply to a magistrate's determination. At least one circuit re-
quires the district court to grant a full de novo evidentiary hearing when
either party requests one,58 but most circuits leave this determination to
the district court's discretion. 9 The district court may, if it so chooses,
make an independent evaluation of the magistrate's decision to release or
to detain.60 Generally, though, the district court proceeds from the pre-
sumption that the magistrate's decision is correct;" hence, the district
court is unlikely to modify the magisterial order unless it decides to con-
duct its own evidentiary hearings or it concludes that the magistrate com-
mitted clear error in issuing her order.
II. CIRCUIT COURTS AND DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW
A. Development of the "Clearly Erroneous" Standard
A minority of the circuits use the "clearly erroneous" standard when
reviewing the release or detention orders of district courts. The Fourth
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1988).
56. This review is conducted only at the district court's discretion. The Second, Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that a district judge who reviews a magistrate's order must provide her
own findings to support her decision, but need not conduct a de novo hearing. See United States v.
Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d at 246; United States v. Wong-Alverez, 784 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.
1986) (Wong-Alverez II) (sufficiency of record to review transcript of magistrate's hearing); see also
United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1987) (de novo hearing not required); United
States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1390 (3d Cir. 1985) (need for de novo hearing for district court to
determine).
57. However, subsections 3145(a) and (b) limit the review to revocation or amendment of the
original order. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1988).
58. See United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985).
59. See cases cited infra note 60.
60. Although the statute is silent on the standard of review, the five circuits that have addressed
this question have uniformly held that the district court should conduct a de novo review of the
ultimate determination, although what is entailed in a de novo review is not specified. See United
States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court should "reach its own independent
conclusion"); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d at 1390 (de novo review but within discretion of
district judge to conduct evidentiary hearing); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir.
1985) (de novo review based upon evidence presented before magistrate and any additional evidence
presented before district court); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d at 1480 (de novo review extends to
district court ordering detention even if no such motion presented to magistrate).
61. See Weinberg, supra note 42, at 3-6.
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Circuit initially implemented this standard and the Second Circuit6" fol-
lowed suit. The First6 and Fifth 5 Circuits employ a similarly deferential
standard in that they require the lower court's findings merely be "sup-
ported by the proceedings below." This criterion is tantamount to the
"clearly erroneous" standard because it precludes independent review of
the lower court's determinations,66 thereby allowing reversal for only the
most egregious errors.
When Congress enacted the BRA, it expressly repealed the appellate
review standard for pretrial determinations provided for in the 1966 Bail
Act. However, Congress neglected to provide a new standard of review for
either pretrial release or detention decisions," although it clearly did not
intend to eliminate appellate review. In fact, the revised provisions of the
BRA granted expedited review to final district court orders.68
Without guidance from Congress as to the standard of appellate review,
it was left to the courts to develop a new standard. The first appellate
court to address the issue was the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wil-
liams.69 Williams involved an appeal by the government from a district
court order granting bail to two individuals indicted for serious federal
narcotics violations. In overturning the district court's decision to grant
bail, the Fourth Circuit adopted a standard of clear error.70 However, the
court offered no reasoning for its adoption of this deferential standard.
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Chimurenga"1 also
failed to provide a rationale for adopting a deferential standard. Without
further elaboration, the court merely cited Williams to support its holding
62. United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985).
63. See Williams, 753 F.2d at 333; United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir.
1985). The Second Circuit appeared to rethink its standard in United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4
(2d Cir. 1987), where it held that if the district court did not make "explicit," id. at 6, and "con-
crete," id. at 5, findings, a more flexible standard of review was warranted, and in United States v.
Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1986), where it held that whether the district court
considered any conditions which would assure the defendant's appearance is a mixed question of law
and fact subject to a more flexible standard of review. The Second Circuit ultimately retreated from
this interpretation in United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195-97 (2d Cir. 1987), which attempted
to harmonize the seemingly contradictory decisions and strongly emphasized the "clearly erroneous"
standard.
64. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 722 (1982)). The First Circuit, however, in United
States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 518-20 (1st Cir. 1985), demands independent review of post-
conviction appeals denying bail. Oddly enough, the Bayko court relies heavily upon Delker, which
involved a pretrial bail appeal.
65. United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985).
66. Id.
67. Compare Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (appellate stan-
dard for pretrial bail decisions enacted) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988) (current version,
amended BRA excludes former appellate review standard for pretrial bail decisions).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1988).
69. 753 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 333 n.12.
71. 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985).
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that the clearly erroneous standard is applicable. " These circuits appear
to be continuing to adhere to the congressionally created (and later abol-
ished) review standard adopted under the 1966 Bail Act.
The First Circuit, in creating its own version of the clearly erroneous
standard in United States v. Jessup, 8 relied upon Wright's Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure manual,7 4 which states that "[a]n order concerning
release prior to conviction is to be affirmed if it is supported by the pro-
ceedings below."7 5 This statement, however, was lifted directly from a
provision of the 1966 Bail Act that Congress repealed when it enacted the
BRA.76
No court gave a justification for granting deference to the lower courts'
determinations until the decision in United States v. Fortna.7 In Fortna,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a denial of bond to a defendant charged with
importing cocaine. The court in Fortna noted that theJessup court's stan-
dard based on what is "supported by the proceedings below" is "more
appropriate to our role as an appellate court and is more in keeping with
our precedents. 7'  To support its adoption of this standard, the court
made a comparison to its earlier ruling under the 1966 Bail Act in United
States v. Golding.79 Golding, a case involving a post-conviction appeal,
relied upon United States v. Thibodeaux" for establishing its review stan-
dard. The Thibodeaux court, although specifically ruling on the scope of
review given a magistrate's order by a district court, simply noted that the
1966 Bail Act mandated the scope of review for an appellate court when
reviewing the pretrial order of a district court."1 Congress expressly re-
pealed this section of the 1966 Bail Act, however; thus it should have no
persuasive effect under the BRA.82
B. Development of the De Novo Standard
The de novo, or independent, standard of review was first enunciated
by the Third Circuit in United States v. Delkers8 and was subsequently
adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
These courts uniformly agreed that the appropriate standard for appellate
72. Id. at 405.
73. 757 F.2d 378, 387-88 (1st Cir. 1985).
74. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 772 (1982).
75. Id.
76. Id. In the 1989 Supplement to Federal Practice and Procedure, an addendum to note 15
indicates that "[s]ome cases have held that this [1966 review standard] continues to be the rule under
the 1984 Act." The circuit split is noted, but no substantive change is made in the text of § 772.
77. 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 250.
79. 742 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1984).
80. 663 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 521-22.
82. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
83. 757 F.2d 1390 (3d Cir. 1985).
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review was an independent examination of the lower court's legal
conclusions.
Delker involved an appeal by defendants who were ordered detained
prior to trial under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.8" In determining its scope of review, the Delker court found indepen-
dent appellate review appropriate because the Senate declared that the
procedure for appeals under the BRA was "set forth in Rule 9 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."85 Several years earlier, the Third
Circuit in United States v. Provenzano interpreted this very same lan-
guage from the legislative history of the 1966 Bail Act as requiring inde-
pendent review of detention orders.8 6 The Delker court also noted that
since Congress had amended the 1966 Bail Act to allow the government to
appeal release decisions, an expanded scope of appellate review would
best serve the public interest.8 7
With minor modifications, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits have adopted this standard.88 Although these circuits aligned
themselves with the Third Circuit, they noted that the reviewing court
should neither hear witnesses nor conduct further evidentiary inquiries.8 9
Each of these courts indicated that it would not disturb purely factual
findings of the district court, but would conduct an independent review of
the release or detention determination itself. However, none of these cir-
cuits demanded that the district court conduct a de novo evidentiary hear-
ing,90 nor did they make a uniform attempt to scrutinize the fact-finding
process used by the magistrate or district court. They merely sought to
ensure that reasons for release or detention were set forth in writing for
the purposes of appellate review. These courts never carefully articulated
the nature of the independent inquiry they envisioned, nor did they dis-
cuss the extent to which they would defer to the factual findings of lower
courts. This cursory review of the lower courts' fact-finding process re-
sults in a reliance on non-Article III magistrates in making serious consti-
tutional determinations.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
85. S. REP., supra note 4, at 29 n.92, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3212.
86. 605 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1979). Under the 1966 Bail Act, the government was not allowed to
appeal a release decision; hence, only decisions for detention required a standard of review. See supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
87. 757 F.2d at 1399; see also S. REP., supra note 4, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3213.
88. United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pones, 786 F.2d 758
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Montamedi,
767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d. 1467 (1lth Cir. 1985).
89. FED. R. APP. P. 9(a) allows appellants to file additional information before the appellate
court, but is silent as to whether additional evidentiary hearings should be conducted.
90. An interesting exception to this rule occurred when an Eighth Circuit judge sitting alone,
preliminary to a panel consideration, conducted his own evidentiary hearing in a pretrial detention
case. See United States v. Jacob, 767 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1985). This is the only available evidence of a
circuit court actually conducting an evidentiary hearing. As a rule, such conduct is discouraged.
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III. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CREATION OF A STANDARD
No single, precise rule exists to guide an appellate court in choosing a
standard with which to review lower court decisions; both precedent and
legal tradition, however, recognize several factors appellate courts should
consider in determining the appropriate scope of review." The most cru-
cial of these factors is congressional authorization. Congress has the au-
thority to set the scope of appellate review in bail appeals because there is
(generally) no constitutional right to seek appellate review in criminal
cases. 2 Hence, courts are obligated to apply review standards enacted by
Congress.
In the absence of explicit congressional guidance, courts should also
consider policy arguments 93-those factors which depend upon matters of
established policy, precedent, and judgment, but are not necessarily bind-
ing upon the courts.9 4 Policy considerations typically include both the im-
portance of the constitutional questions raised by the appeal and the
scope of review applied in analogous situations.
A. Legislative History
Though Congress failed to articulate a review standard for appellate
courts under the BRA, its intentions can be gleaned from a careful study
of the Act's legislative history. The 1966 Bail Act provided that courts
should affirm pretrial detention decisions on appeal if they were "sup-
ported by the proceedings below."9" Thus, under the 1966 Bail Act, the
circuit courts applied a deferential (clearly erroneous) standard in review-
ing lower court determinations. The 1966 Bail Act, however, did not al-
low a judicial officer to order detention based upon a finding of "danger-
ousness," nor did it contain a presumption in favor of detention for a
91. See, e.g., Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate
Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1983)
(discussing appropriate factors to consider in determining scope of review); Louis, Allocating Adjudi-
cative Decision-Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the
Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993 (1986)
(discussing factors affecting proper allocation of decision-making authority).
92. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 392 (1985) (no absolute right to appeal in criminal cases).
93. See generally Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (advo-
cating policy considerations in appellate review).
94. See id. Professor Monaghan argues, for example, that constitutional fact review should be a
discretionary function.
95. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 496 (1984)
(appellate court has obligation independently to review violation of First Amendment rights); see also
Monaghan, supra note 93, at 230-40 (arguing that constitutional fact review is appropriate where it
is discretionary and where it assesses important policy considerations); Note, The Future of Libel Law
and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477 (1986) (noting importance of independent appellate review in
protecting First Amendment rights).
96. Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150
(1988)).
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specified group of offenders. Courts have long recognized detention for
risk of flight, included in the 1966 Bail Act, as a legitimate exercise of
state power.97 Hence, Congress apparently envisioned no need for careful
appellate scrutiny of pretrial release or detention orders under the earlier
bail act.
Although Congress enacted clear pretrial review standards in the 1966
Bail Act, it failed to provide a standard of review for post-conviction de-
tention decisions pending appeal; this created a void which the Third Cir-
cuit attempted to fill in United States v. Provenzano,98 which set forth the
review standard eventually adopted by each of the circuits. In
Provenzano, the court found the general policy goal that "one convicted of
a crime shall be entitled to bail while appealing his conviction" ' called
for independent appellate review. Provenzano involved the appeal of de-
fendants convicted of violating Federal racketeering laws. The trial court
detained the defendants following conviction; the defendants then filed a
motion for an order releasing them on bail during the pendency of their
appeal. Although the appellate court denied the motion, it did hold that a
reviewing court had an obligation to conduct an independent examination
of the trial court's decision. The court noted that while Congress had en-
acted a clear error standard for the appeal of pretrial determinations,
Congress had specifically exempted post-conviction review from this
standard."'
In the absence of statutory guidance, the court looked to Rule 9 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 9(b) requires that after the
trial court has reached a decision to release or detain, it must set forth "in
writing the reasons for the action taken." ' In addition, the parties may
include (for appellate review) "such papers, affidavits, and portions of the
record"10 2 as they consider relevant to their appeal. The court interpreted
Rule 9(b) to permit appellate consideration of evidence that may not have
been submitted to the trial court. 0 3 If the parties chose to expand the
record on appeal, submitting evidence never reviewed by the trial court, it
was difficult to see how an appellate court could adopt any standard but
de novo review. Hence, the Provenzano court found it necessary for an
appellate court to conduct a de novo review of district court bail determi-
nations.104 This review, however, did not include conducting further evi-
dentiary hearings (by the reviewing appellate court). It merely enabled
97. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
98. 605 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1979).
99. Id. at 87.
100. Id. at 91-92.
101. FED. R. App. P. 9(b).
102. Id.
103. Provenzano, 605 F.2d at 93. However, the court did not explain how it would accept addi-
tional evidence.
104. Id. at 92.
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appellate courts to consider additional evidence on appeal and then deter-
mine independently whether the facts sustained the release or detention
order.
Congress, aware of the Provenzano standard, °5 expressly repealed the
pretrial review provisions of subsection 3147(b) of the 1966 Act in enact-
ing the BRA and made no provision for the standard of appellate review
of either pre- or post-trial detention decisions.1" 6 Congress simply declared
that the appellate procedures mirror those "set forth in Rule 9 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."'0 7 Although the repeal of the for-
mer review standard cannot be taken as positive proof of a course of ac-
tion, it does imply that Congress relied upon (and generally accepted) the
post-conviction review standard established in Provenzano. Had Congress
intended a deferential standard of review under the BRA, it would not
have needed to repeal the review provision of the 1966 Bail Act. There is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that appellate courts were to
apply different standards of review in evaluating pre- or post-conviction
bail appeals.108 The legislative history suggests that Congress intended a
single standard of review to prevail-that formulated by the Provenzano
court.
Congress made three further changes in the BRA that also demonstrate
the need for appellate courts to take a more active role. Under the 1966
Bail Act, petitioners were required to seek a second review by the court of
original jurisdiction, even if that court had made the initial determination
to release or detain."' The BRA, however, allows for direct appeal to the
circuit court from a final district court order."0 It would seem to follow,
therefore, that the absence of the second review mandated by the 1966 Act
requires appellate courts to take a more active role in conducting their
reviews. Furthermore, the 1966 Bail Act confined appellate review to
those situations "in which the defendant has been detained or has been
ordered released subject to the condition that he return to custody after
specified hours.""' Thus, the earlier act did not permit appellate review
unless the initial hearing imposed some form of actual detention. The
BRA, however, allows a defendant to appeal irrespective of whether he
105. See S. REP., supra note 4, at 28, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3186.
106. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985) notes that the legislative history
of the BRA is silent on the standard of review.
107. S. REP., supra note 4, at 29-30 & n.92, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3182, 3212.
108. Given the fact that Congress left the appellate process intact (indeed, expanded it by provid-
ing the government a right of appeal), there is also nothing to suggest that Congress intended a return
to the pre-1966 Bail Act standard (habeas corpus review).
109. Compare Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150
(1988).
110. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
111. S. REP., supra note 4, at 29, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182,
3212.
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was detained because of an inability to meet the prescribed conditions." 2
With the elimination of these restrictions on the appellate process, Con-
gress seemed eager to invite increased appellate scrutiny of all conditions
of release. A third difference in the BRA is that it empowers the govern-
ment to appeal a release order, an action specifically omitted in the 1966
Bail Act.x13 This provision enables appellate courts to expand their role in
the release decision. Taken together, these modifications foresee an ex-
panded role for appellate review. 1"
B. Constitutional Rights Implicated Under the BRA
Appellate courts often conduct independent review of lower court deci-
sions when a constitutional right is at stake. 5 In a case denying bail, an
incorrect determination has a chilling effect on personal liberty, thus war-
ranting a strict, encompassing standard of review.
1. Eighth Amendment Concerns
The Supreme Court in Salerno declared that the preventive detention
sections of the BRA did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 1 ' The Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment provides a check primarily against
the judiciary,"' preventing courts from setting unreasonable bail for oth-
erwise bailable offenses. Congress, however, was found free to create or
abolish bailable offenses as benefitted the government's interest." 8
Traditionally, however, Federal law has been careful to provide bail to
all those arrested for non-capital offenses." 9 Congress permitted courts to
deny bail only in exceptional circumstances.1 20 Thus, Congress granted a
general right to bail' 2 -it did not create special categories where bail was
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1988).
113. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
114. This development may not necessarily imply the need for independent review; taken together
with the other evidence proffered, however, it adds weight to the proposition that Congress intended
independent review.
115. See L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMNISTRATiVE ACTION 624-53 (1965); Strong,
The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact", 46 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968); see, e.g., Monaghan,
supra note 93, at 335 (constitutional fact review requires independent appellate review); Note, supra
note 95 (arguing for necessity of independent appellate review).
116. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-55 (1987); see also supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text.
117. 481 U.S. at 752-55.
118. Id; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the Supreme Court
has yet to determine what limits the Eighth Amendment would put on Congress in denying defend-
ants bail.
119. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); see Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
120. Courts thought capital defendants were likely to flee; hence courts routinely denied them
bail. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (bail generally permitted except in capital cases). Courts also denied bail
to those who had threatened jurors or witnesses with physical violence. See Carbo v. United States, 82
S. Ct. 662, 667-68 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962) (denial of bail pending appeal because of threats
to witnesses); United States v. Payden, 768 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1985) (denial of bail prior to trial
because of threats).
121. See Mayer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139, 1164-69 (history of
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to be provided; rather, it carefully etched out categories where bail could
be denied, such as in capital cases.
Though Congress may be able to craft a class of cases to be excluded
from the category of offenses receiving bail, there is nevertheless an inher-
ent difficulty: The BRA merely creates a new exception to the otherwise
broadly defined category of cases in which bail is permitted. If a person
does not fall within the criteria established by Congress for denying bail,
that person has a right to be protected from excessive bail. Thus, if a
court fails to follow statutory prescriptions for denying bail, renders an
incorrect determination and withholds bail, the court violates the Eighth
Amendment because the individual falls out of the "bail excepted" cate-
gory and is placed within the framework of cases in which bail is allowed.
In that instance, a court may not set bail higher than that which is needed
to assure the appearance of the defendant at trial. Indeed, in the legisla-
tive history of the BRA, Congress made clear it would not tolerate unrea-
sonably high amounts of bail set for the sole purpose of detention.12 If a
judicial officer incorrectly incarcerates an individual without bail, the dep-
rivation clearly exceeds that needed to ensure the defendant's appearance
at trial; hence, an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Thus, the
finding of the judicial officer conducting the bail hearing has a direct
bearing upon the individual's constitutional right to be protected from ex-
cessive bail.
Appellate courts, then, must look to see that lower courts have ex-
hausted all possible conditions of release before ordering detention. The
BRA is emphatic that pretrial detention be a last resort.' Circuit courts
need to guarantee that lower courts have carefully considered and rejected
all release conditions. If a release condition exists that will ensure the
appearance of the defendant at trial and protect community safety, failure
to order that release condition would result in an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation. To ensure Eighth Amendment protections, appellate courts must
be able to make an independent determination as to the correctness of the
district court's detention order.
2. Fifth Amendment Concerns
Although some circuits apply independent review to the actual deten-
tion decision, there is another step in the review process to consider. The
Fifth Amendment requires that no one be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. 24 The Supreme Court in Salerno held that the preventive
bail in United States).
122. S. REP., supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws. 3182,
3187.
123. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
124. Under the BRA the deprivation can be lengthy. While the Speedy Trial Act requires a
ninety-day release period for most prisoners, it carves out exceptions for complex cases. 18 U.S.C. §
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detention sections of the BRA passed Fifth Amendment scrutiny because
the determination of whether to deny bail is made by a judicial officer
subject to appellate review.125 This review follows an adversarial proceed-
ing in which the defendant enjoys most basic trial rights.1 "" The Supreme
Court in Salerno and Congress in the BRA's legislative history each stress
the importance of the procedural safeguards contained in the BRA.1 7
Unfortunately, recent evidence indicates that detention hearings are
often never convened or, if held, fail to meet due process requirements. 2 8
Given the emphasis placed upon procedural requirements, it is essential
that appellate courts pay special attention to the process used by the mag-
istrate and district court to conduct detention hearings. Magisterial deci-
sions should not receive deferential review because pretrial detention
raises important constitutional questions.1 29
The right to bail may not be absolute, but like other rights dependent
upon statutory construction or implicit in constitutional values, it is so
essential to the preservation of other rights30 that it may be limited only
to further a legitimate state interest."'- To deprive a defendant of bail
without ensuring adequate due process would be to grant Congress the
power to impinge upon a defendant's liberty interest without restraint. In
the absence of independent appellate review, the risk of unjust detention is
simply too great.132 Thus, it is necessary to have appellate courts closely
3161(h) (1982). These "complex cases" are often the subjects of preventive detention. See Henderson
v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (upholding delay of two years between indictment and trial).
125. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-44 (1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 743-45; S. REP., supra note 4, at 7-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3182, 3190-91.
128. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
129. Magistrates, as non-Article III judges, do not normally merit the deference often accorded
district court judges. This is especially true in cases of constitutional significance. Indeed, some schol-
ars have argued that in any "arising under" or "Federal question" case, it is not necessarily vital that
the Supreme Court have review as long as some Article III court has jurisdiction. Hence, because of
the serious constitutional issues involved, the district court, as an Article III court, should be statuto-
rily required to conduct a de novo review of magisterial determinations (including de novo evidentiary
hearings). See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1985) (arguing for necessity of some Federal court to hear particu-
lar type of case, but not necessarily Supreme Court).
130. Indeed, the deprivation of personal liberty is disabling; in addition to the stigma attached to
incarceration, courts have long recognized that the disruption of family life, the loss of association with
others, economic hardships, restrictions on travel, the difficulty in preparing an adequate defense, and
the increased likelihood of a forced confession place a severe strain upon the individual. See Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (incarceration disrupts family life); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1972) (ability to travel and associate with family and friends are
important rights); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (liberty is fundamental interest not to
be easily limited); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (incarceration impedes defendant's ability to
prepare adequate defense).
131. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (discussing rights unmentioned in Con-
stitution which preserve other rights).
132. In a review of pretrial bail cases in the Eastern District of New York, the General Account-
ing Office discovered that 26% of all individuals incarcerated before trial (as flight and/or danger
risks) were detained without the benefit of a detention hearing. The district courts did not correct
these blatant violations of due process. GAO REPORT, supra note 44, at 29.
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supervise the detention process in order to provide guidance to lower
courts and to enforce due process norms.
IV. FRAMING A STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appropriate review standard must take into account the institutional
functions of courts. Although the legislative history and the magnitude of
the constitutional questions involved argue for de novo review, it is impor-
tant to determine exactly what the appellate courts should review and how
they should conduct that review. The scope of review granted by appellate
courts cannot be entirely divorced from that made by the district courts.
Indeed, as Article III courts, district courts lay claim to having their deci-
sions respected by reviewing tribunals. Thus, before a standard of review
can be constructed, the institutional functions and relative capabilities of
the district and circuit courts must be briefly explored.
A. Traditional Institutional Functions of Trial and Appellate Courts
Appellate courts have, arguably, three essential institutional func-
tions.1 33 First, appellate courts are well-suited to develop and declare legal
principles that will apply beyond the case at bar and serve as precedent in
future cases. Second, they traditionally provide a "corrective function" to
guarantee that lower courts have done justice in a particular case.1 " Fi-
nally, appellate courts can play a supervisory role, thereby ensuring that
proper and consistent procedures have been followed throughout the
circuit.1 "
The trial judge generally enjoys no significant advantage over an appel-
late judge in applying a given legal rule to a set of facts. A three-judge
appellate panel may, in fact, be in a better position to make legal determi-
nations because it benefits from the give and take associated with judicial
negotiation and is not encumbered by the difficult, time-consuming pro-
cess of conducting evidentiary hearings.13 ' Hence, appellate judges can
devote more time to examining legal questions.13 7
The grant of a right to appeal also includes the opportunity to correct
significant mistakes made at the trial level. 3 Constitutional rights depen-
133. See Phillips, The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Spring 1984).
134. It is a basic assumption in the American judicial system that appellate review helps ensure
the "correctness" of a decision. See Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985).
135. See Louis, supra note 91, at 1017.
136. See Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 72 (1944).
137. Specifically applied to appellate review under the BRA, the reviewing courts perform an
important institutional function when they give substance to statutorily prescribed terms. For exam-
ple, in predicting "dangerousness," a standard replete with intricate problems, appellate courts can
provide a substantive, working definition of the term that can serve as future precedent.
138. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (coirecting results of ball proceeding); see also
COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEL-
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dent upon statutory construction are at special risk when determined by a
fact-finder who acts alone and thus without the collective wisdom, experi-
ence, and consistency an appellate court can bring to bear on a detention
decision."3 9 The Supreme Court relied upon this recognition in deciding
Salerno.40 The constitutional rights implicated in the pretrial release or
detention decision and the complexity of the legal judgments the magis-
trate must make provide a strong case for independent appellate review of
the lower court's determination."' Although appellate review in criminal
cases is not constitutionally mandated,"' the emphasis placed on review of
bail decisions favors allowing appellate courts to fulfill their corrective
role.
Trial courts enjoy their greatest advantage over appellate courts in
making findings of fact from evidence presented directly at trial. This is
especially significant when the factual findings are based upon an evalua-
tion of the credibility of witnesses as they have appeared on the stand
before a trial judge. However ill-equipped appellate courts are for con-
ducting evidentiary hearings, they are, nevertheless, well-equipped to
scrutinize the fact-finding process itself. This is a traditional function of
appellate courts"3 and one that should apply to appellate review of deten-
tion hearings. Appellate courts can ensure that individual district court
judges and, in turn, magistrates, have followed proper procedures in con-
ducting hearings, thereby eliminating arbitrary or uncertain application of
the BRA's release or detention provisions. Congress in the BRA's legisla-
tive history and the Supreme Court in Salerno both place heavy emphasis
on the procedural safeguards provided in the BRA; hence, to guarantee
fairness, it is incumbent upon appellate courts to ensure that correct pro-
cedures are followed throughout the circuit.
B. The Two-Pronged Standard of Appellate Review
In order to prevent unjust detention and implement congressional policy
choices, this Note contends that appellate courts should adopt a two-
pronged standard of review. 44 A two-pronged standard, incorporating a
LATE COURTS 20-21 (1977) (noting importance of correcting trial court errors).
139. Monaghan, supra note 93, at 239-45; Calleros, supra note 95, at 409-12; see also Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (suggesting that trial
judges, acting alone, exercise substantial power).
140. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself corrected the Second Circuit's decision. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-45 (1987), rev'g 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir 1986).
141. This is especially significant when the district court has not made a de novo review of the
magistrate's findings. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (discussing appellate review of
jurisdictional facts).
142. Stack, 342 U.S. at 6 (although this has broad qualifications).
143. See Calleros, supra note 91, at 415-20.
144. While this standard may place additional burdens upon appellate courts, the gravity of the
pretrial detention issue makes it incumbent upon the circuits to take care that no citizen's rights are
violated. If Congress is truly interested in protecting rights and serving justice, it might seek means
other than preventive detention to accomplish these ends.
[Vol. 99: 885
Pretrial Bail
process-oriented review with the independent review currently used by se-
lect circuits, would both acknowledge the limitations of the appellate
courts and ensure that lower courts apply fair and consistent standards.
The scope of appellate review should turn on the degree of scrutiny the
district court gives the magistrate's initial determination, the written find-
ings supplied by the district court, and any additional evidence the parties
present to the appellate court.
1. The Initial Prong: A Process-Oriented Review
An independent, process-oriented review by appellate courts will force
district courts (and magistrates) to consider all possible alternatives to de-
tention and will protect the rights of the defendant. Upon review of a
release or detention order, the reviewing court should take the following
steps. First, the court should determine if the district court made a de
novo review of the magistrate's hearing. If the district court conducted no
such review, the appellate court should remand the appeal to the district
court for a de novo determination. Second, because appellate courts are
not the proper tribunals for conducting evidentiary hearings, they should
determine if the judicial officer followed the procedures mandated in the
BRA1 " and if the process of conducting the detention hearing comports
with due process concerns.146 The appellate court should seek to discover
whether the trial court followed each of the procedural requirements of
the BRA. If the district court conducts de novo evidentiary hearings in
accordance with due process requirements, the court of appeals should
apply a deferential standard to the district court's historical fact-
findings.1 47 The inherent danger of unjust detention and the poor efforts
made thus far in meeting due process requirements demand that circuits
conduct a scrupulous review of pretrial detention procedures.
2. The Second Prong: An Independent Review of Legal Conclusions
The ultimate determination of whether to release or detain should al-
ways be granted independent review because of the important constitu-
tional questions the BRA raises. Hence, the appellate court should look at
the evidence proffered and make an independent assessment of whether
the defendant should be released or detained. The appellate court should
145. For example, the BRA forbids an undue length of detention or unreasonable conditions of
release or detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988).
146. The reviewing court must ensure that counsel is granted, an adversarial hearing is provided,
cross-examination of witnesses is allowed, etc. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. In
short, the reviewing court must police the hearing in order to assure compliance with the salient
provisions of the BRA.
147. Even when reviewing additional evidence submitted under FED. R. APP. P. 9, however, the
appellate courts can accept historical facts found by the district court and need not reconvene eviden-
tiary hearings. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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independently establish whether the facts found by the lower courts, taken
together with any additional evidence submitted on appeal, satisfy the
statutory standard for detention. The appellate court should ensure that
the district court has considered every possible means of release prior to
ordering detention. If a release condition exists that will satisfy the de-
mands of the BRA, the appellate court should grant it. An independent
review of the district court's decision to release or detain will force district
courts to consider alternatives to detention. The reviewing court should
not feel bound to the district court's decision and should feel free to amend
or modify the release or detention order as if it were the initial decision
maker. Thus, the appellate review standard should be an independent re-
view apart from the final order of the district court.
V. CONCLUSION
Appellate courts should carefully review the procedures used in the evi-
dentiary hearings to ensure that due process requirements have been satis-
fied and to guarantee that alternatives to detention have been considered
and rejected before detention is imposed. District courts should be re-
quired to conduct de novo review of magisterial orders. If this review oc-
curs, appellate courts should give deference to purely historical findings of
fact. In spite of the need to prevent crimes committed by persons released
on bail, it remains difficult to reconcile the operation of the preventive
detention sections of the BRA with fundamental principles of fairness and
justice. Thus, courts of appeals are in a unique position to protect the
rights of criminal defendants by conducting an independent review of the
trial court's bail determination. Independent appellate review is essential
to retain the real force and meaning of the BRA's procedural safe-
guards-safeguards the Supreme Court held essential to the proper func-
tioning of the BRA.
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